Assessing rational expectations 2评估合理预测 2：经济学的"析出"稳定性 免费 夸克云 mobi azw3 pdf 下载 chm snb

The rational expectations hypothesis （REH） dominates economic modeling in areas ranging from monetary theory， macroeconomics， and general equilibrium to finance。In this book， Roger Guesnerie continues the critical analysis of the REH begun in his Assessing Rational Expectations： Sunspot Multiplicity and Economic Fluctuations， which dealt with the questions raised by multiplicity and its implications for a theory of endogenous fluctuations。 This second volume emphasizes "eductive" learning： relying on careful reasoning， agents must deduce what other agents guess， a process that differs from the standard evolutionary learning experience in which agents make decisions about the future based on past experiences。 A broad “eductive” stability test is proposed that includes common knowledge and results in a unique“rationalizable expectations equilibrium。” This test provides the basis for Guesnerie's theoretical assessment of the plausibility of the REH's expectational coordination， emphasizing， for different categories of economic models， conditions for the REH's success or failure。

Guesnerie begins by presenting the concepts and methods of the eductive stability analysis in selected partial equilibrium models。 He then explores to what extent general equilibrium strategic complementarities interfere with partial equilibrium considerations in the formation of stable expectations。 Guesnerie next examines two issues relating to eductive stability in financial market models， speculation and asymmetric price information。 The dynamic settings of an infinite horizon model are then taken up， and particular standard and generalized saddle-path solutions are scrutinized。 Guesnerie concludes with a review of general questions and some "cautious" remarks on the policy implications of his analysis。

ⅠEductive Stability：Introductory Analysis and Overview

1 An exploration of the eductive justifications of the rational-expectations hypothesis

　2 Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability

　3 Anchoring economic predictions in common knowledge

Ⅱ General Equilibrium Expectations：From Macroeconomics to Microeconomics

4 Short-run expectational coordination ：fixed versus flexible wages

　5 On the robustness of the analysis of expectational coordination ：from 3 to n + 2 goods

　6 Eductive stability in sequential exchange economies ：an introduction 171

Ⅲ Coordination in Finnce Models

7 (De)stabilizing speculation on futures markets ：an alternative viewpoint

　8 Common knowledge and the information revealed through prices ：some conjectures

　9 Do prices transmit rationally expected information?

　10 Eductively stable transmission of information through prices ：a brief review of results

Ⅳ Intertemporal Eductive Stability

11 Successes and failures in coordinating expectations

　12 Coordination on saddle-path solutions ： the eductive viewpoint - linear univariate models

　13 Comparing expectational stability criteria in dynamic models ：a preparatory overview

Ⅴ Conclusion

14 The government and the market expectations

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书籍介绍

The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) dominates economic modeling in areas ranging from monetary theory, macroeconomics, and general equilibrium to finance. In this book, Roger Guesnerie continues the critical analysis of the REH begun in his Assessing Rational Expectations: Sunspot Multiplicity and Economic Fluctuations, which dealt with the questions raised by multiplicity and its implications for a theory of endogenous fluctuations. This second volume emphasizes "eductive" learning: relying on careful reasoning, agents must deduce what other agents guess, a process that differs from the standard evolutionary learning experience in which agents make decisions about the future based on past experiences. A broad "eductive" stability test is proposed that includes common knowledge and results in a unique "rationalizable expectations equilibrium." This test provides the basis for Guesnerie's theoretical assessment of the plausibility of the REH's expectational coordination, emphasizing, for different categories of economic models, conditions for the REH's success or failure.Guesnerie begins by presenting the concepts and methods of the eductive stability analysis in selected partial equilibrium models. He then explores to what extent general equilibrium strategic complementarities interfere with partial equilibrium considerations in the formation of stable expectations. Guesnerie next examines two issues relating to eductive stability in financial market models, speculation and asymmetric price information. The dynamic settings of an infinite horizon model are then taken up, and particular standard and generalized saddle-path solutions are scrutinized. Guesnerie concludes with a review of general questions and some "cautious" remarks on the policy implications of his analysis.